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A somewhat new approach to the analysis of defense issues
in the United States Senate has been developed in this thesis.
The Relative Agreement statistic of Brams and O'Leary was
used to obtain similarity observations between twenty Senate
defense votes for both 1969-1970 and 1971. These similarity
observations were then used as input data to KYST, a multi-
dimensional scaling computer program. The scaling solutions
resulting from KYST showed that the most important dimensions
in explaining pro-defense voting were non-partisan/partisan
and foreign policy/domestic policy. By using the pro-defense
proportion of the vote as the dependent variable and coordi-
nates from the two-dimensional solution as the independent
variables, a regression model was obtained for predicting
pro-defense vote. Within the time period under consideration,
an examination of regression coefficients revealed that
future arguments for defense programs in the Senate should
emphasize foreign policy and non-partisan aspects of such
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I. INTRODUCTION
Collective decision-making has become a fertile field
for analysis in the past twenty years although study in this
area began long before that. Legislative roll-call analysis
has its origins around the beginning of this century when
A. Lawrence Lowell, a historian and president of Harvard
University, began such studies. Lowell published "The
Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America"
in 1901. He tried to show the effect of membership in a
political party on the voting behavior of legislators in
the United States and Great Britain using roll-call data
[Ref. 2]. In 1928, an American writer of great influence
in this field, Stuart Rice, produced Quantitative Methods
in Politics in which he discussed quantitative analytic
methods for studying roll-call votes. Anderson, Watts and
Wilcox in Legislative Roll-call Analysis [Ref. 2], a well-
known source on methods for analysis of roll-call data,
state that there was not much work done with roll-call
votes from the time Rice published his work until after
World War II. They hypothesize that there are several
reasons for the increased interest in roll-call analysis
in recent years. First, trends among political scientists
have been a major contributing factor. More emphasis has
been placed on research in the area of individual actions
in political institutions rather than in the study of the
institutions exclusive of the individuals within them. In

addition, recent trends have tended to reflect a belief that
political scientists should analyze political affairs with a
view to rendering an accounting of public policy. Not only
have these trends developed, but a move toward more quanti-
tative analysis has also manifested itself, and roll-call
data is certainly quantitative in nature. Second, the
development of new techniques such as Guttman scale analysis
and factor analysis has accelerated the use of roll-call
data. Third, and perhaps most significant in the view of the
author of this thesis, is the development of high-speed
computers which enable analysts to perform tasks which were
formerly impossible, or so complicated that for practical
purposes they were impossible. In fact, Carl F. Kossack
[Ref. 21] has stated the following amazing fact, ". . .in
some respects whatever data processing was evolved in the
1940 's can now be done a million times faster."!
One of the studies conducted in the late nineteen-forties
was "Consistency of Voting by Our Congressmen" by Dean P.
Brimhall and Arthur S. Otis [Ref. 5]. This is an interesting
investigation of roll-call data but one of little application
today. However, it might be useful to discuss it briefly.
Brimhall and Otis took ratings by New Republic Magazine on
the votes of 512 Congressmen to look at "consistency" in
voting. A separate analysis was accomplished for Senators
and Representatives. If New Republic gave a voter a plus
(+) on a given roll-call, his vote was considered "progres-
sive." A minus (-) was considered "anti-progressive." A

zero indicated the voter was absent or paired. Using these
ratings, the authors determined the percentage of the time
each legislator voted "progressively" as viewed by Mew
Republic. For example, if a voter were present and voting
for ten votes and cast eight "progressive" votes, his per-
centage was 80%. They then divided the list of Senators
(or Representatives) into sevenths on the basis of "progres-
siveness" percentages. The top seventh was given a score
of one which indicated the most "progressive," or liberal.
The next seventh, was scored with a two, and so on down the
line until a seven was given to the bottom seventh, which
consisted of the most "anti-progressive," or conservative,
Senators (or Representatives) . This procedure was followed
for roll-call votes during a four year period. After aggre-
gating the data for Senators and Representatives, Brimhall
and Otis found that 4 6% of the Congressmen did not change
their scale values from one year to the next, 83% did not
change more than one unit from year to year, and 95% did not
change more than two units on the rating scale from year to
year. These figures indicate a very high degree of consis-
tency of voting among Congressmen. The result is not
altogether unexpected since the time period, four years, is
a relatively short one to expect an individual's viewpoint
to change radically. However, the method of achieving the
result by using roll-call data is quite interesting, and
rather innovative to have been written twenty-five years ago
The authors themselves said that they believed their work to

be the first study of consistency in voting among members of
Congress
.
Shortly after the Brimhall-Otis study appeared, Duncan
MacRae, Jr. began his pioneering work on the Massachusetts
House of Representatives. MacRae was particularly interested
in the interaction between the legislator and his district.
In Ref. 27, he examined two variables, "per cent owner
occupancy of dwelling units" in the legislator's district
and the margin of election victory over his opponent. MacRae
used these two variables as a basis for drawing inferences
from roll-call votes in three sessions of the Massachusetts
House. The "per cent owner occupancy of dwelling units"
variable had a tendency to differentiate between Republican
and Democratic districts. There was a higher percentage of
owner occupancy in primarily Republican districts and he
found that there appeared to be a relatively distinct cutoff
on each end of the scale so that Republican districts tended
to be high and Democratic districts were low. However, there
was a middle ground of significant overlap. Interestingly
enough, the closely contested seats (defined by a winning
margin of less than 60% of the two-party vote) were over-
whelmingly found to be in the overlap region for owner
occupancy. After examining roll call votes, MacRae found
that representatives coming from districts typical of their
party tended to be most loyal to the party on roll calls and
that those representatives coming from districts where their
election was close tended to reflect the characteristics of

their constituency more than those whose elections were not
close. He recommended that anyone desiring to influence a
legislator to cross party lines might be more successful if
he chose one coming from a district which was not typical of
his party. He also felt that it might be somewhat easier to
convince a representative to vote contrary to his consti-
tuency if that representative came from a district where he
had a large victory margin in the previous election. This
article might well be considered a landmark study of the
impact of socio-economic factors on the votes of legislators.
In a later article [Ref. 28], MacRae delved deeper into
the relationship between the security of a legislator's
position; i.e., years of continuous service and previous
electoral margins of victory, and his voting habits. To
accomplish this, he constructed a Guttman scale of liberalism
and conservatism for the 1951-52 session of the Massachusetts
House, and examined the occupations of members when the legis-
lature was not in session. MacRae also looked at the effect
of national and state elections on the local elections of
representatives. He found that there was some influence of
races for Governor, President, and so forth, on the election
of legislators in their districts but there was also a ten-
dency for legislators to be able to "buck the tide" if they
had more seniority. MacRae also noted that those with more
seniority had a tendency "to run farther ahead of their state
tickets" than junior legislators. He attributed some of this
result to their votes on the "liberalism-conservatism

dimension." He also felt that senior members tended to be
more like professional politicians and exhibited greater
loyalty to party leaders.
Moving ahead a few years to look at another analysis of
roll-call data, one finds "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in
the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal" by Arend
Lijphart [Ref. 26]. The author looked at 44 roll-call votes
on the issues of colonialism from 1956 to 1958 in the United
Nations General Assembly. Lijphart used an Index of Agree-
ment proposed by Stuart Rice and Herman Beyle to examine
coalitions in the General Assembly and attempt to determine
how cohesive these blocs of votes were. While this study
is somewhat more sophisticated in terms of technique and
objectives than that of Brimhall and Otis and the early
MacRae studies, it still does not fully utilize the power
of an electronic computer.
Only two years later, Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett
[Ref. 1] examined four different UN General Assembly sessions
using factor analysis, a statistical technique borrowed by
social scientists from psychologists. The object of the
Russett-Alker study was the isolation of issues and alignments,
or blocs, in the four sessions. Thus, this investigation
might be viewed as an expanded version of Lijphart' s study
having similar objectives, although still more sophisticated
methods were used.
Then, in 196 8, Duncan MacRae, Jr. and Susan Schwarz
[Ref. 30] used cluster analysis, factor analysis, and
10

multidimensional scaling to investigate the votes of Repub-
lican Congressmen in the 1955 and 1956 sessions of Congress.
The primary objective of the study was a comparison of
various techniques that could be used to identify issues as
perceived by Congressmen. This study would not have been
feasible without the use of an electronic computer.
The preceding very sketchy review of the literature on
roll-call analysis for the past twenty-five years obviously
does not do justice to the many scholars in the field. An
example is Duncan MacRae, Jr. who has, according to Anderson,
et al , "pioneered the development of roll-call analysis in
recent years" [Ref. 2, p. 119]. However the object was not
to conduct a complete survey of the literature but to
indicate the trends in roll-call analysis. It is clear that
a revolution of sorts has occurred if one looks at the Brim-
hall-Otis study of 1948 and compares it to the MacRae-Schwarz
study of 1968.
By way of review, then, it appears that three distinct
trends have developed in the analysis of roll-call votes in
the last twenty-five years. First, those social scientists
studying voting bodies have begun to examine the effects of
political actors in their institutions in a more quantitative
manner as in Brimhall-Otis , the early MacRae studies, and the
Lijphart U.N. analysis, and have begun to try to render an
accounting of public policy by identifying policy issues as
in the Alker-Russett and MacRae-Schwarz studies. Second,
Guttman scaling, factor analysis, and to some extent, multi-
11

dimensional scaling, are new techniques that have been chosen
to facilitate roll-call analysis. Third, the development of
the high-speed electronic computer has been indispensible to
the analyst seriously attempting to examine voting bodies by
quantitative methods.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ROLL-CALL ANALYSIS
"Congressional Government is Committee Government,"
thought Woodrow Wilson in 1884 [Ref. 41]. In 1962, Heinz
Eulau said [Ref. 17]
Whether, in fact, the roll call is the most important step
in the legislative process—an implicit assumption, certain-
ly in many roll-call studies--is a matter of argument. By
the time a bill comas up for final action, it has been
scrutinized, debated, and amended in committee or on the
floor, if not compromised in the cloak room. The final
vote may conceal more than it reveals.
If these statements be true, why study roll-call votes
at all? Eulau himself provides a partial answer when he
says [Ref. 17]
Whether a bill finds unanimous support, is reluctantly
accepted, or acrimoniously contested, just as the align-
ment of legislators along partisan, rural-urban, and
other lines of cleavage, can tell us much about the
functioning of the political system as a whole. Much
important work has been done along these lines.
Thus, one can gain insight into the political process by
studying roll calls. But beyond this, it would seem now to
be possible to glean more information from these records, at
least with regard to the United States Senate.
Much of the action on bills now occurs on the floor of
the Senate in roll calls. Committees have not relinquished
their power but Senators appear to no longer be reluctant to
12

offer amendments on the floor which run counter to the recom-
mendations of the relevant committee. Consider the amendment
by Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.) to amend HR8687, Military
Procurement Authorization for Fiscal Year 1972, recommending
that the President submit an alternate defense budget for
Fiscal Year 1973 not to exceed $60 billion. The mere offer-
ing of such an amendment is astonishing, since Senator
McGovern was not on the Armed Services Committee, but the
fact that it received 31% of the vote on a roll call in the
Senate would have been inconceivable only a few years prior
to that time. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) said of this
amendment, "That such a proposal would even be made in the
Congress will certainly send shock waves through our defense
establishment and the confidence of our free world allies"
[Ref. 10, p. 318]. Senator Thomas Mclntyre (D-N.H.), a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated,
"There is no need for such drastic and ill-considered action
with respect to the defense budget" [Ref. 10, p. 318]. It
is interesting to note that when Senator John Stennis
(D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
introduced the above procurement bill, he felt that "This
bill as reported outlines an austere and prudent program
. . . which should be funded now" [Ref. 10, p. 316]. Yet an
amendment gaining substantial support on the Senate floor was
put forward requesting the President to submit an alternate
proposal cutting 15% to 20% from the overall defense budget
for the next year. This vote, and others like it, indicate
13

that, while committees still retain the reins of power in the
Senate, a great deal of the action now occurs on the Senate
floor.
Dr. Edward Laurance [Ref. 25] has hypothesized that this
process began in 1967 and 1968, at least with regard to the
defense budget, and Senatorial relationships reached the
stpresent degree of relative independence in the 91 Congress.
Prior to this time, the Senate, and particularly the Armed
Services Committee, was little more than a rubber stamp for
the defense budget. However, that is no longer the case,
and non-defense spending now competes on a co-equal footing
with defense spending for tax dollars. This is due, in part,
according to Dr. Laurance, to an increase in the power of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, which can now success-
fully challenge the Defense Department on its budget requests,
but also to a proliferation of expertise in defense and
national security policy throughout the Senate. The latter
cause has led to an increase in debate on these issues on the
Senate floor and the offering of a greater number of amend-
ments to defense bills.
According to Lawrence J. Korb [Ref. 20]
Since the late 1960 's, Congress has taken an increasingly
larger role in the examination of the defense budget. . . .
With increasing frequency floor fights over particular
items have extended the legislative phase of the defense
budgeting cycle halfway into the fiscal year. It appears
that the days when Congress would approve $70 billion




Table 1, taken directly from Korb * s article, shows the
seemingly sudden change in Congressional attitudes toward
the defense budget beginning in 1969.
It is clear that 1969 represents a turning point in
Congressional consideration of defense spending, since cuts
have averaged $4.23 billion per year since 1969 and only
$.476 billion for the period 1962-1968. This represents
almost a tenfold increase in the amount of money cut from
the budget each year, beginning in 1969.
There is an historical legislative basis for the recent
increase in power of the Armed Services Committee. Section
412(b) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1960 requires that [Ref. 14]
No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to
or for the use of any armed force of the United States
for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval
vessals unless the appropriation of such funds has been
authorized by legislation enacted after such date.
Prior to the enactment of this law, the only congressional
contact with military weapons procurement or, indeed, overall
defense policy came in the appropriations committees which
were swamped with the sheer magnitude of this and other
budgetary decisions. With the passage of this bill, the
legislative committees; e.g., Armed Services, became involved
in the matter of examining defense policy. Raymond Dawson
of the University of North Carolina has stated [Ref. 14] that
the Congressional role in defense policy-making has been
expanded in three respects as a result of Section 412. First,




CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES IN DEFENSE BUDGET RFQUESTS
FY 1962-1973





1962 +0.58 + 268
1963 +0.48 + 230
1964 -3.66 - 1797
1965 -1.51 - 717
1966 -0.18 - 81
1967 +0.70 + 403
1968 -2.30 - 1638
1969 -6.75 - 5201
1970 -7.49 - 5638
1971 -3.13 . - 2147
1972 -4.02 - 2951
1973 -6.56 - 5221
Average change -2.81 - 2040
Total change -24490
Average absolute 3.10 2191
change
Congress deals only with the new obligational authority
(NOA) requests of the administration.
2Excludes funds for military construction, civil defense,




has been expanded. Second, Congress is now able to focus
on specific areas of policy, rather than the overall defense
budget in which major policy decisions may be buried. Third,
the Congress ' base of knowledge on defense issues has been
expanded as a result of the first two improvements.
Dawson's analysis of the situation prior to Section 412
is corroborated by Lewis A. Dexter [P.ef. 15], who conducted
interviews with Congressmen during the period 1955-57.
Dexter found the Congressmen were generally concerned with
more mundane decisions such as manpower requirements rather
than overall strategic policy decisions. Members of the
House Armed Services Committee looked upon it as a "real
estate committee," meaning that it was concerned only with
location, sale, and transfer of defense installations.
Hence, with the passage of Section 412(b), the role of
the Senate Armed Services Committee was strengthened and a
greater base of knowledge was available to the Congress as
a whole. The eight years may be what was required for the
Armed Services Committees to develop the expertise in defense
matters
.
As a result of these developments, the years 1969 through
1971 were chosen for this analysis of defense issues since
little information would be obtained by looking at defense
roll-call votes prior to 1969.
In summary, despite Woodrow Wilson's famous comment on
Congressional governmer , which is still largely true at
least with regard to power in Congress , the study of defense
17

roll-call votes is considered interesting and profitable for
the aforementioned reasons.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS
In the past few years, issues involving the armed forces
and the Department of Defense (DOD) as well as the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) have been subjected to increasing
scrutiny by the United States Senate. In an era of shrinking
funds for national defense and defense-related programs,
decision-makers need to be aware of the manner in which
Senators view bills in these areas. It was the rather
ambitious objective of this analysis to examine Senate roll-
st
call votes for the 91 Congress and the first session of
the 92 Congress to determine the dimensions of perception
that Senators had for votes on defense-related issues during
the period. Minor objectives were the determination of
whether or not these dimensions remained the same from
Congress to Congress and an attempt to relate these dimen-
sions of perception to the outcomes of votes.
C. OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE USFD FOR THE ANALYSIS
To determine dimensionality, a relatively new technique
called multidimensional scaling was employed. To use this
method, it was necessary to obtain measures of similarity-
dissimilarity between roll call votes. An index called
Relative Agreement proposed by Steven Brams and Michael
O'Leary [Ref. 3], which will be discussed later, was chosen
18

to obtain the comparisons. These measures were then used
as input to a multidimensional scaling computer program
called KYST [Ref. 24]. The results from KYST were examined
to discover the number of dimensions that could best be used
to explain the perceptions of Senators on the selected votes
Then, using multiple linear regression [Ref. 39], a model
was formulated to explain pro-defense voting as a linear
function of these dimensions.
19

II. DISCUSSION OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING
J. B. Kruskal of Bell Telephone Laboratories has developed
the basic procedure for multidimensional scaling which is
used in the KYST computer program. In Refs. 2 2 and 23,
Kruskal explains the algorithm he has conceived to accomplish
this scaling. The procedure will be discussed in some detail
below.
For an example of an application of multidimensional
scaling, see Ref. 16 in which James Capra and Richard Flster
examined the preferences of U.S. Naval officers at the Naval
Postgraduate School for selected public personalities to
serve as President of the United States. They were able to
obtain a reasonable two-dimensional solution for these
preferences
.
A. BASIC CONCEPTS OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING
1 . Monotonicity
The underlying concept of multidimensional scaling,
as described by Kruskal, is monotonicity. In Ref. 22, he
states
The problem of multidimensional scaling, broadly stated,
is to find n points whose interpoint distances match in
some sense the experimental dissimilarities of n objects.
. . . What is essential is that we desire a monotone
relationship, either ascending or descending, between the
experimental measurements and distances in the configura-
tion.
Thus, one wishes to obtain a configuration of n points
which have interpoint distances that correspond to the
20

experimental dissimilarity observations of n objects. A more
descriptive term for these dissimilarities is "psychological
distance" since these observations are generally obtained by
relying upon human perception of the differences, or
"distances," between all possible pairs of the n stimuli.
These "psychological distance" measurements, or dissimilarity
observations, are designated by the term 6. ., which represents
the dissimilarity between stimuli i and j . The number of
6. . 's required is n(n-l)/2 since all possible distinct pairs
are to be compared. Henceforth, the letter m will be used
to represent the quantity n(n-l)/2.
The m dissimilarity measures are, in fact, ordinal
measures and imply only rank order information. However,
rank order is all that is desired. Once it is known that
stimulus A is closer to stimulus C than to B and B is closer
to A than to C, it is possible to place the points A, B, and
C in a configuration in two-dimensional space such that the
Euclidean distances between them correspond in rank order
precisely to the rank order of the "psychological distances."
Thus, the respondents in an experiment yield judg-
ments, or "psychological distances," of stimuli which can be
ordered as follows
:
6. . < 6. . < . .. < 6. .
X l=Jl 1 2^J 2 Vm
The experimenter then desires to obtain a multidimensional
mapping of n points whose interpoint distances, d. ., come
as close as possible to satisfying
21

d. < d. . < . . . d. .
X1^I ~ x 23 2 " Vb
It is always possible to place n points in an
(n-1) -dimensional space such that rank order between the
points is preserved. However, quite often one desires to
find a smaller dimensional space to describe the data. For
instance, if there were twenty points, nineteen dimensions
would be required. However, if one could find a configura-
tion in three dimensions that would come very close to
preserving the rank order relationships, such a reduction
in dimensions would be extremely useful. ^his idea corres-
ponds somewhat to the concept of parsimony in factor analysis
2 . Stress as a Measure of Monotonicity
In order to determine how close a configuration of
points is to having a perfect monotone relationship with the
6..'s, Kruskal introduces a measure called stress. Stress
is represented as
Stress = S • =
2






. is the Fuclidean distance between points i and j
and the d. .'s are a sequence of numbers having the same
rank order as the 6. ,'s but are chosen as closely as possible
to the d. .*s, the actual Euclidean distances in the config-
uration". For an example of the computation of stress,
including the d. .*s, see Appendix A.
22

It is clear that the stress is zero if the term
d. . - d. . is zero for all i and j. This, of course , means
ID ID
that there is no difference between the actual Euclidean
distances and a sequence of numbers having the same rank
order as the "psychological distances" between the n stimuli.
Hence, given the desire to achieve a monotone relationship
between the d. .'s which is like the monotone relationship
between the 6. .'s it is obvious that the objective is to
ID
obtain a configuration of points (x. , . . . ,x. , . . . ,x ) that will
yield a stress as close to zero as possible.
Therefore, Kruskal has, in effect, formulated a
non-linear program for multidimensional scaling of the
form
n-1 n 9
E E (d. .-d. . )
i=l j=2 ^ l 3
Minimize Stress = k I —
^
^n-1 n „
x,d E E d7.
i=l j=2 ^
i<j
Subject to d. <d. <...<d.
i lDl - i 2 : 2 - - ^
Whenever 6. < 6 . . <...<<$. .
where d.
. is the Euclidean distance between point x. and
ID v l
point x.. To perform this minimization in his program,
Kruskal uses a modified gradient technique, which he discusses
in some detail in Ref. 23.
Based upon his own experience with stress as a
measure of goodness of fit of a configuration of points
,
Kruskal has made an empirical assignment of word descriptions
23

for selected values of stress to indicate the degree of
acceptability of the solution. He states the relationships
as follows [Ref. 22]:






It should be noted that Kruskal multiplies these values by
100 and lists stress as a percentage; e.g., 20% instead of
.200. There is no reason to do this, since the result of
the computation would be .20 and not 20. Additionally, the
KYST program does not output the answer as a percentage.
Hence, any mention of stress herein will be in decimal form
and not in percentages.
An important omission in Kruskal' s discussion of
stress is his failure to treat the problem of an increase in
stress due solely to an increase in the number of points
being scaled. For instance, twenty-five points scaled in
three dimensions is likely to have a higher stress than
fifteen points in three dimensions simply because the non-
linear program for minimization of stress has more con-
straints. Hence, Kruskal' s criteria for measuring accept-
ability of stress do not take into account the difficulty of
achieving a low stress with a greater number of points.
Also, for a given number of points, the stress is likely to




There have been several studies of the significance
of stress as a measure of goodness of fit. Herbert Stenson
and Ronald Knoll [Ref. 38] attempted to find a crude prob-
ability distribution for stress values for random data, i.e.
randomly generated 6. .'s. They looked at stress for ten
through 60 points in increments of ten, and offered a rather
conservative rule for rejecting a solution as being generated
from random data. David Klahr [Ref. 18] performed a much
more thorough analysis for six, seven, eight, ten, twelve,
and sixteen points. He was able to make more definitive
statements about the probability distribution for these
points. For example, from Klahr 's Table 2, one can observe
that for 16 points, there is a probability of .05 of obtain-
ing a stress of .170 or less in three dimensions by using
random data. These two studies will be used later as a
benchmark from which to judge the validity of solutions
obtained by multidimensional scaling.
B. OUTLINE OF THE BASIC SOLUTION PROCEDURE
IN THE KRUSKAL ALGORITHM
The solution procedure for the nonlinear program is a
modified gradient technique. Once the dissimilarities between
objects have been obtained, they are then ordered in a mono-
tone increasing fashion. If similarities are used, the
ordering is monotone decreasing. Then, an initial configur-
ation of points is constructed. The stress and the gradient
of stress are calculated for the initial configuration. An
appropriate step-size is computed and movement is made along
25

the gradient for the amount of that step-size. Stress and
gradient are calculated for the new configuration and compared
to the desired stopping criteria. This procedure is continued
until the stopping criteria, as specified by the user of the
program, are satisfied. For the details of the algorithm,
see Ref. 7.
C. PROBLEM OF LOCAL MINIMA
As with any minimization problem involving a non-unimodal
objective function, it is possible to arrive at a local
minimum rather than a global one. Kruskal has recognized
the possibility of such an adverse circumstance. However,
he attempts to minimize the impact of the problem by stating
that (1) several solutions can be obtained using different
initial configurations and compared for the lowest stress;
(2) a configuration produced by a local minimum is probably
not far wrong if the configuration lends itself to an
intelligent interpretation; (3) the stress must be low to
make the solution of interest anyway; and (4) it is possible
to make a very close examination and comparison of the data
and the solution for inconsistencies. While these statements
are true, the problem is one of some consequence. It is
quite possible that a local minimum will prevent the itera-
tive procedure from arriving at a solution which is either
interpretable, has a low stress, or both, even though such a
solution may exist. Unfortunately, there is no guaranteed
way to guard against such an unpalatable eventuality. Some
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studies of multidimensional scaling techniques have been
conducted to determine among other things, their suscep-
tability to this phenomenon.
Ian Spence [Ref. 37] and Harold Spaeth and Scott Guthery
[Ref. 36] examined several multidimensional scaling algorithms
and found that, indeed, they were subject to local minima.
Spence examined TORSCA-9, SSA-I, and MDSCAL using Monte
Carlo simulation. Spaeth and Guthery studied SSA-I and
MDSCAL using geometrical shapes as input.
To counter the local minimum problem, as well as to
incorporate other features, Kruskal combined parts of his
MDSCAL program with parts of TORSCA-9 by Torgerson and
Young to produce KYST, a considerably improved program for
which apparently no comparative studies have been published
to date. However, KYST should perform better than MDSCAL
since it embodies some of the best elements of MDSCAL and
TORSCA-9.
D. DETERMINATION OF NUMBER OF DIMFNSIONS
Before any results can be obtained, the experimenter must
be able to determine how many dimensions to extract from the
data. This is probably the most difficult part of the
analysis. Kruskal offers three criteria for this task.
First, the program should be run in several dimensions and
a stress versus dimensionality plot should be made. If
there is a distinct "elbow" in the curve connecting the
values of stress at a given dimension, say three, this would
indicate that four or more dimensions have only slightly
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better stress. Hence, one could explain the data just as
well by using three dimensions as he could by using more.
Second, one must be able to interpret the dimensions he
extracts. It is obvious that stress is non-increasing as
the number of dimensions increases. However, if one can
only interpret the results in two dimensions, it makes little
sense to use three or more merely because the stress is
slightly lower. Third, if the data is very accurate, one
can supposedly use more dimensions [Ref. 22]. However, as
Stenson and Knoll [Ref. 38] have noted, the exact relation
of the accuracy of the data to the number of dimensions one
can extract is unclear. Shepard [Ref. 34] has added a fourth
criterion. He says that the solution should be readily
visible to the human eye and hence, of two, or at most three,
dimensions. This last recommendation is debatable since if
more than three dimensions are required, one would think
that they should be used. Shepard acknowledges this but
strongly urges that the experimenter should stop at three
dimensions if at all possible. His basic argument is that
a large number of dimensions will present problems of presen-




III. "AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF VOTING BODIES"
As discussed previously, in order to use multidimensional
scaling to identify dimensions of voting, one must have some
measure of similarity-dissimilarity between votes. A
measure called Relative Agreement, described in an article
by Steven Brams and Michael O'Leary [Ref. 3], was used for
this purpose. A discussion of the salient points in the
article pertaining to Relative Agreement follows.
A. FOUNDATIONS OF THF MODEL
Brams and O'Leary go to great lengths to explain that
they attempted to construct a model, beginning with defin-
itions and axioms, which would provide a rigorous development
of indexes and measures to be used in the analysis of voting
data. The index of interest for this thesis is related to
agreement between votes. Hence, only selected portions of
the model will be treated here.
1. Probability of Agreement of Two Randomly-
Selected Members on a Given Roll Call
For this model, a member in a voting body is permitted
three options. He may vote "yes," "no," or he may abstain
from voting. With these options as a basis, after a roll
call has occurred the probability that two randomly-selected
members, r and s, agreed on the roll call can be computed.
This probability is just the sum of the probabilities that
the two members both voted "yes," both voted "no," or both
abstained. The probability of two randomly selected members
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having voted "yes" is simply the ratio of the possible number
of ways two members could vote "yes" to the total possible
numbers of pairs, or
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The lower case letters y, n, a, and t indicate the number of
"yes," "no," "abstain" and total votes, respectively, for a
particular roll call. Therefore, the "Probability of Agree-
ment" of two randomly-selected members on a given vote is
P(AG ) = Y(y-l) + n(n-l) + a(a-l)
rs' t(t-l)
It must be pointed out that the actual distribution of votes
must be known, after the fact, to determine this probability.
For example, if it is known that for a ten-man voting body,
on a particular vote there were five affirmative votes,
three negative votes, and two abstentions; i.e., y = 5, n = 3,
a = 2, the probability of agreement for that vote is
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It should also he noted in passing that the prohahility of
agreement changes with the size of the voting body. For a
one-hundred member body split in a ratio of five to three
to two as before, the probability of agreement would be
P(AG ) = 50(49) + 3 °( 29 ) + 20(19)
rs' 100(99)
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This change in P (AG ) occurs simply because, when the number
of voting options remains constant, there are more ways for
two members to agree in a one-hundred-member body than in a
ten-member body, or alternatively, as Brams and O'Leary view
it, there are fewer ways for two members to disagree. As a
result of this rather unfortunate anomaly, P(AG) and Relative
Agreement, a measure which is based on it, are valid measures
of agreement only for voting bodies of the same size. This
fact will become significant later in the analysis.
2 . Axioms of the Model
Brams and O'Leary propose two axioms as the basis for
the development of their model. The first axiom is stated as
follows
Axiom 1. If P(DGrs ) is equal to the probability
that two randomly-selected members r and s
disagree on a roll call,




This axiom merely states that the events "agreement" and
"disagreement" between two members on a given roll call are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Axiom 2 has provoked some controversy in the liter-
ature. It appears as
Axiom 2. The probability of agreement of two
randomly-selected members on a roll call(s) is
statistically independent of the probability of
agreement on any other roll call(s). More
formally, the number of agreements of two randomly-
selected members on each roll call (0 or 1) are
mutually independent random variables.
Aside from the fact that probabilities are not independent,
events are independent as Mayer [Ref. 31] noted, the authors
admit that this particular stipulation is unrealistic in
view of the well-known propensity of politicians to bargain
for votes. For instance, an affirmative vote on an issue
affecting New York City may be traded for an affirmative
vote on a farm bill affecting Iowa. Additional and perhaps
more serious violations, as Brams and O'Leary recognize,
occur when a voter comes from a fairly homogeneous political/
geographical region; e.g., a Southern Democrat, or whenever
any other situation, such as strict party discipline,
introduces a consistent bias into the voting behavior of
members of that body. However, as Mayer has shown [Refs. 31
and 32] the independence assumption of Axiom 2 is not neces-
sary for most of the desired indexes derived in this model if
some adjustments in the computational formulas are made.
Indeed, Brams and O'Leary point out [Ref. 4] that the assump-
tion of independence is not needed to obtain the expression
for Expected Agreement between two randomly selected members,
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E (AG ), over a set of roll calls. In fact, they even go
so far as to state that [Ref. 4]
. . . All our indicators, with the exception
of the variance level (VL) measure which does
depend on the independence assumption, are
unaffected when his [Mayer's] probabilities
are substituted for ours.
This statement can be made because of the fact that mathe-
matical expectation is a linear operator. The expected value
of the sum of n random variables is equal to the sum of the
expected values of the n variables [Ref. 33]. The preceeding
statement is true whether or not the random variables are
independent. Hence, the calculation of E (AG ), as the sum
of the E(AG), or P (AG ), for all of the individual roll
calls in which r and s vote, is a valid one. However, the
authors mention one index in footnote 35 where a type of
independence assumption is not only necessary but desirable
for the index to be meaningful. This index is Relative
Agreement between votes (rather than members) and will be
discussed in the next section.
B. RELATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN VOTES





- E (AG . .
)
E(AGij )
where RA- • is the Relative Agreement between roll-call votes
i and j, AG . . is the actual number of "agreements" between
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votes i and j, and F(AG. .) is the expected number of "agree-
ments" between the two roll-calls.
The quotation marks around agreements in the previous
paragraph are used to indicate the expanded definition of
agreement implicit in this index. Two members, r and s, are
said to have "agreed" on votes i and j if they voted the
same way with respect to each other on each vote. Members
vote the same way on two votes if they agree with each other
or disagree with each other on both votes; i.e., take
mutually consistent positions on the two votes. For example,
if member r votes "yes" and member s votes "yes" on vote i,
then they must both vote either "yes," "no," or "abstain"
on vote j to "agree" for votes i and j. Also if member r
votes "yes" and member s votes "no" on vote i, or vice
versa, then the votes of members r and s must be different
on vote j to "agree" on i and j. Through this broader
definition of agreement, one can determine that two members
view two votes as similar, in some sense, if they "agree"
on the votes. By making all comparisons of pairs of voters
for two roll calls, i and j, using the criteria discussed
above, one can obtain AG. ., the actual number of "agreements"
between i and j
.
The calculation of E (AG . .) requires the computation of
the total probability of "agreement" between i and j. This
total probability of "agreement" is defined as the sum of
the products of P (AG ) . and P (AG ) . and the product of
P(DG^ ). and P (DG ).. Thus,
rs 1 rs j
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P(AGij> total = P(AGrs>i P(AGrs>j + P(DGrs>i P(DGrs>j
The E (AG .
.
) is simply the product of P (AG..
)
tota i and the
total possible number of pairs in the voting body or
E (AG . . ) = P (AG . . ) . . , X N
13 i] total
where N represents the total number of distinct pairs. By
multiplying the P (AG )*s and the P (DG )'s together, one
is assuming that agreement between two randomly-selected
members on vote i is independent of agreement between two
randomly-selected members on vote j . The assumption of inde-
pendence is desirable for this indicator since one is
interested in determining whether or not two votes are similar
or disimilar as viewed by the legislature as a whole. By
utilizing RA. . as an index, one is able to obtain some measure
ID
of the departure from independence, in the aggregate, for the
two votes. Looking back at RA.
.
, it is clear that a negative
value indicates that there are fewer "agreements" than expec-
ted under the assumption of independence; i.e., AG. . is less
than E (AG . .). This is an indication that the votes are, in
some sense, dissimilar. In like fashion, a positive value
indicates more agreements than expected and hence the votes
are taken to be similar.
However, it must be observed that this measure is an
ordinal one. A Relative Agreement of .700 does not mean that
the two votes compared are twice as similar, on any kind of
scale, as two votes which have a relative agreement of .350
even if one vote appears in both pairs. Such a situation
would merely imply that the two votes with a .700 value are
more similar than the two votes with a .350 value.
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It must be remembered that there is a problem with the
application of this index in practice. Relative Agreement
comparisons are valid only for measuring agreement on votes
for which the size of the voting body remains constant
because P (AG ) changes with the size of the voting body.
For this reason, the use of Relative Agreement will be
limited to those cases where the number of members does not
change. The problem, as it applies to this thesis, will be
discussed further in a later section.
Thus, Relative Agreement provides an ordinal measure of
the similarity between roll call votes, the type of measure
which is needed to perform multidimensional scaling on
different roll call votes. In terms of the earlier notation,
Relative Agreement between votes i and j, RA , . will correspond
to the dissimilarity measure, 6. ., discussed in the section
on multidimensional scaling. In order to further explain
this measure, an example of the calculation of RA. . is pre-
sented in the next section.
C. EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF RFLATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN VOTES
Consider a hypothetical five-man voting body which has
cast the following votes on three roll calls:




1 2 3 4 5
1 Y N Y N A .2 .8
2 N Y Y N Y .4 .6
3 Y N N N N .6 .4
For votes one and two, the total "probability of agreement" is
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= (- 2 )(- 4 ) + (-8) (.6) = .56
For votes one and three
P(AG13 ) tQtal = (.2) (.6) + (.8) (.4) = .44.
For votes two and three
P(AG 23 ) total = ( ' 4)( ' 6) + (- 6 )(- 4 > = - 48 -




= .56(10) = 5.6
E(AG13 ) = .44 (10) = 4.4
E(AG 23 ) = .40(10) = 4.8
The number of "agreements" between one and two is four,
because members one and two, one and five, three and four,
and four and five "agree" on votes one and two. Hence,
AG,. - E(AG )
RA.L
12 E(AG 12 )
-t*4**-"
Similarly,










- E(AG 23 )RA23 =
-
K(AG 23 )
= LZ*J. m .254.8
Thus if these three votes were rank ordered in pairs accord-
ing to increasing similarity (Relative Agreement) , the
ordering would be
Votes 12 13 23
RA. . -.29 -.09 .25
ID
The procedure discussed in this example was used to obtain




IV. DISCUSSION OF PPOCEDUFE USED IN THE ANALYSIS
The information on roll-call votes for this analysis was
obtained from data compiled by Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
a non-partisan Washington, D.C. firm which, among other things,
records all roll-call votes of Congressmen and Senators. If
any member fails to vote or go on the record for a particular
roll call, Congressional Quarterly sends that member a ques-
tionnaire asking his position for that vote. As a result of
this procedure, called the CQ poll, "voting participation"
as defined by Congressional Quarterly is, in general, very
high. For the years covered by this analysis, "voting
participation" in the Senate as a whole for all roll calls
was 95% in 1969 [Ref. 8, p. 1036], 91% in 1970 [Ref. 9,
p. 1135], and 93% in 1971 [Ref. 10, p. 92].
To aid those studying the Congress, Survey Research
Center at the University of Michigan maintains Congressional
Quarterly roll-call data on magnetic tape. Voting informa-
tion for the votes analyzed in this thesis was obtained from
these magnetic tape records. In addition, for further back-
ground on votes, Congressional Quarterly Almanacs were
consulted.
A. COMPUTATION OF THE RELATIVE AGREEMFNT INDEX
1 . The Problem of Different Numbers of Voters
for Different Roll Calls
The first problem to arise in the computation of
Relative Agreement was the necessity of having voting bodies
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of the same size. As is well-known, not all Senators vote on
every roll call. Thus, there may be 78 Senators voting on
bill X and 93 Senators voting on bill Y. Using Relative
Agreement for these two votes would not accurately measure
the "agreement" between the two since the number of voters
is different. As mentioned previously, probability of agree-
ment changes with the size of the voting body and this biases
the Relative Agreement index. However, since voting partici-
pation from Congressional Quarterly records is high for the
Senate and one might reasonably view a failure to respond
to a CQ poll as an abstention, the following procedure was
used. All votes recorded as "yes," "paired for," and
"announced for or CQ poll for" were considered "yes" votes
for the purposes of this analysis. All votes recorded as
"nay," "paired against," and "announced against or CQ poll
against" were considered "no" votes. Votes listed by
Congressional Quarterly as "not voting," "voted 'present',"
and "did not announce" were considered abstentions. Thus,
for a vote with 29 yeas, 61 nays, one paired for and one
paired against, three announced for, two announced against,
and three not voting, the values for computation of P (AG )
would be y = 33, n = 64, and a = 3.
2 . The Problem of One Voter Leaving the Legislature
and Being Replaced by Another
The Relative Agreement index requires that one be
able to compare member r's response on vote number one to
member s's response on the same vote and then compare their
responses on all succeeding votes to obtain Relative Agreement
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for vote number one with all other votes. Suppose, however,
that member s is replaced by member u on vote number six.
It is not possible to compare votes one through six with
votes coming afterward unless one is prepared to assume that
member u would have responded in exactly the same manner as
member s for the first six votes had member u been in the
body instead of member s. Such an assumption would be
unjustified in many cases and in all cases one could never
be sure of the validity of the assumption. Therefore,
instead of attempting to make such an assumption, voters
were simply dropped when they were either replaced or were
replacements. During the 91st Congress, Senator Everett
Dirksen of Illinois died and was replaced by a political
appointee, Ralph Smith, until the election in 1970 in which
he was defeated by Adlai Stevenson, III. Stevenson took the
seat for the remainder of the session. It would be unreason-
able to assume that these three men would have all voted
exactly the same way on all roll calls. Hence, Senator
Dirksen's seat was dropped from the analysis for 1969-1970
and only 99 Senators were included in the Relative Agreement
computations. For 1971, Senator Winston Prouty of Vermont
died and was replaced by Robert Stafford so Senator Prouty'
s
seat was dropped. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia died
in early 1971, but his replacement, David Gambrell, arrived
soon enough to vote on the first defense vote so the Russell
seat was retained. However, Senator Karl Mundt of South
Dakota was ill the majority of the 1971 session and his
seat was also dropped since a failure to vote could not
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reasonably be considered an abstention in this case. There-
fore, there were only 98 Senators considered in the 1971
session.
B. SELECTION OF VOTES
The method for selection of votes was an iterative
process. Votes initially selected for inclusion in the study
were all those from the session which were defense-oriented.
Two lists were prepared for each period (1969-1970 and 1971)
.
A "short" list of 42 votes for 1969-1970 and another "short"
list of 48 votes was compiled for 1971. A "long" list of 60
votes was then compiled for both periods. KYST is limited
to 60 points and this capacity limitation precluded the use
of more votes.
The original list for 1969-1970 contained over 100 votes.
Therefore, a "first cut" approach to culling some votes was
needed. This problem is common to almost all voting studies.
One must have some criterion for reducing the number of votes
under consideration. The choice of this criterion is often
purely arbitrary. In this case, the criterion mentioned by
David Koehler in Ref. 19 was used to initially reduce the
list of votes. After an examination of eleven sessions of
Congress, Koehler came to the conclusion that any roll call
in which the opposition mustered at least 15% of the vote was
one in which a significant degree of contesting was found.
It should be noted that there are other criteria such as
amount of voting participation and an index measuring both




significance coefficient which may be found in Chapter Five
of Ref. 2. However, any of the measures are, to some degree,
arbitrary.
An additional reason for the choice of Koehler's approach
is the fairly large number of defense appropriations type
bills where the vote is unanimous or very nearly so. Agree-
ment on these votes does not generally mean the same thina
as agreement on votes that are contested. A Senator may
have reservations about certain aspects of an appropriations
bill, for example, but will vote for it because there is no
way for him to use an item veto on those parts he dislikes.
Hence, the agreement on this type of bill is artificially
inflated, and such votes would tend to bias any results if
they were included in the analysis. As a result of these
considerations, it was decided to use Koehler's method of
vote selection for this study.
After applying the 15% criterion to the initial list of
votes for 1969-1970, 43 votes were dropped. There were 14
votes in 1971 which had less than 15% opposition.
Reduction of the list of votes by the Koehler criterion
still left too many votes for both years. At this point,
votes were subjectively selected by the author to obtain
what was thought to be a manageable number. In the case of
the 1969-1970 data, this manageable number was 42 votes for
the "short" list and 60 votes for the "long" list.
The subjectivity in vote selection alluded to earlier
simply means that the author eliminated those votes which did
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not appear to be primarily defense-oriented in nature, even
though there were implications for defense in the bill. For
example, a vote on the establishment of a standing committee
on Veterans 1 Affairs, while related to defense, was not
deemed to be primarily a defense issue and was dropped from
the list. Also, a bill assuring the validity of laws exempt-
ing women from compulsory military service was not considered
primarily a defense issue. This same subjective criterion
was used for eliminating other votes to reach the numbers in
the "short" list and the "long" list. The upper limit on
the number of votes for the "long" list was, of course, 60
as previously discussed. The number on the "short" list
was not fixed but it was simply the case that 4 2 votes
appeared to have strong defense implications.
A FORTRAN computer program was written to calculate
Relative Agreement and these computations were made for both
42 votes and 60 votes. However, there were two problems with
this technique. First, votes were not selected either
systematically or randomly, but subjectively. Second, the
KYST solutions obtained were so cluttered with a large number
of points that interpretation of dimensions was virtually
impossible.
In an attempt to eliminate the second problem, sixteen
votes for 1969, eighteen votes for 1970, and a combined list
of twenty-one votes for 1969 and 1970 were chosen by the sub-
jective method described previously with even more stringent
criteria being applied for a primarily defense-oriented vote.
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Multidimensional scaling solutions were obtained via KYST
.
However, the first problem of subjective bias in vote selec-
tion was still present. To counter this, a final selection
of votes was conducted on a systematic basis. The lists of
defense-oriented votes for 1969-1970 and 1971 were re-compiled
after dropping all votes with less than 15% opposition. Then
every third vote was selected. The final two lists for
1969-1970 and 1971 both contained 20 votes, and these lists
were the ones used to obtain and report the results from
this thesis. These two sets of votes are recorded in Appen-
dix B.
C. USE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
1 . Interpretation of Dimensions and Selection
of Number of Dimensions
Even after reducing the number of votes to the 16 to
20 range, there were still problems in interpreting the solu-
tion and selecting the appropriate number of dimensions.
The matter of interpretation appears to be a universal
problem in the application of multidimensional scaling
[Refs. 16 and 22]. To circumvent this problem, regression
programs were run for both sets of 20 votes with the depen-
dent variable being pro-defense proportion of the vote and
the independent variables being the coordinates obtained
from the KYST solution. The pro-defense proportion of the
vote on a given roll call was defined to be that proportion
which supported the President's position as stated by Congres-
sional Quarterly, or which supported the position of the
majority of Republicans plus Southern Democrats; i.e., the
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Conservative Coalition. Such a criterion was considered
to be much better than attempting to classify votes subjec-
tively as pro-defense merely by looking at the subject and
wording of the bill when the President's position was unknown.
Such a pragmatic approach to the problem of interpre-
tation would seem to have great value in those situations
where the analyst has some quantifiable dependent variable
which he desires to explain. As will be discussed later 7 the
solution to the regression program in three dimensions for
both 1969-1970 and 1971 showed that one variable was not sig-
nificant and could be dropped. This greatly reduced the
difficulties of interpretation since efforts could be devoted
solely to two dimensions. A similar approach using multiple
linear regression was used in Ref. 16.
2 . Usefulness of Regression Results
Another equally important reason for using regression
analysis was a desire to ascertain the relationship between
pro-defense proportion of the vote and the dimensions of the
solution. In addition, significant results from the regres-
sion analysis would provide convincing evidence that the
data had not been manipulated in some way to produce desired
results.
In addition, if a reasonable and significant relation-
ship between the dependent variable and the independent
variables could be obtained, inferences might be drawn about
how best to proceed in presenting arguments for a given pro-
gram. The sign of regression coefficients should give an
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indication of the direction of influence of a particular
dimension. For instance, a positive sign would indicate that
an emphasis on the defense program's characteristics which
were the same as those associated with the positive portion
of that dimension should have a tendency to increase the
pro-defense proportion of the vote. Thus, the regression
analysis should assist in providing a basis for determining
which strategies to employ when presenting the program to the
Senate for approval.
D. VALIDATION OF THE MODEL FOR 1969-1970
Two techniques were used to validate the 1969-1970 regres-
sion model with the 1971 data. First, a Chow test [Ref. 39,
p. 147] for the difference between two regressions was run
for the regression equations obtained for 1969-1970 and 1971.
Second, the 1969-1970 regression model was used to predict
the 1971 pro-defense proportion of the vote for all 20 votes
for 1971 when using the coordinates from the 1971 KYST solu-
tion. Then a correlation between the actual and predicted
values of pro-defense proportion of the vote was calculated.
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V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The scaling solutions for the twenty points in both years
were obtained using three different initial configurations in
an attempt to avoid the problem of local minima. For each
set of votes, one solution was obtained using the initial
configuration that Kruskal took from the TORSCA-9 program and
two others were obtained using random initial configurations.




Dim. TORSCA-9 Random Random Dim. TORSCA-9 Random Random
3 .1131 .1121 .1140 3 .1134 .1203 .1134
2 .1721 .1770 .1736 2 .1878 .1796 .1876
The solutions having the lowest stress were selected. [In
general, the solutions for the same year and dimensions were
very nearly the same. Differences in stress in the third
decimal place do not seem to make an appreciable difference
in the solution configuration.] For 1969-1970, the three-
dimensional solution was the one having a stress of .1121
and the two-dimensional solution was the one having a stress
of .1721. For 1971, the three-dimensional solution was the
TORSCA-9 solution having a stress of .1134 and the two-
dimensional solution was the one having a stress of .1796.
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Before attempting to interpret the results , the criteria
of Stenson and Knoll and Klahr were checked to test whether
or not it was likely that the solutions were generated from
random data.
Stenson and Knoll [Ref. 38] computed average stress
values for similarities generated by random data for ten
points through 60 points in one through ten dimensions.
They then presented a conservative rule for accepting or
rejecting the hypothesis that similarity data is random.
The rule constructs something like an upper confidence inter-
val for stress values of random data. The length of the
interval is determined by the sample range of the stresses
for each set of dimensions and points. If the value of
stress obtained by an experimenter is closer to the average
stress value for random data than twice the width of the
sample range, the hypothesis of randomness cannot be rejected
according to Stenson and Knoll. For both two and three
dimensions, the width of the sample range was .02. The
average stress was .21 for three dimensions and .32 for
twenty points in two dimensions. Thus, one would reject the
hypothesis of randomness in the similarity data for any stress
value less than .17 (.21 - 2 (.02)) in three dimensions and
any value less than .28 (.32 - 2 (.02)) in two dimensions.
Klahr [Ref. 18, p. 328] states that there is a probability
of .05 of obtaining a stress less than .170 for 16 points in
three dimensions and a probability of .05 of obtaining a
stress less than .257 in two dimensions when scaling purely
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random data. He did not perform tests for 20 points. How-
ever, at the .05 level, stress values always increased for
the same number of dimensions when the number of points was
increased. Hence, it would seem logical to extrapolate to
values higher than .170 and .257 for twenty points.
Comparing the stress values from the two sets of votes
to the criteria for random data, it is clear that the hypo-
thesis that the similarity measures were generated from
random data should be rejected. For the two-dimensional
solution, the stress for 1969-1970 was .1721 and the stress
for 1971 was .1796, both of which are less than .28 and .257,
the Stenson and Knoll criterion and the Klahr criterion
respectively. Therefore, the conclusion is that there is some
underlying structure in the Relative Agreement measurements
calculated for the Senate in the 1969-1970 and 1971 sessions.
A. REGRESSION RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF DIMENSIONS
The three dimensions derived from the KYST solution for
1969-1970 and 1971 were used to obtain regression equations
in terms of these variables to determine if all three con-
tributed significantly to the explanation of the dependent




Variable Coefficient T-Value Variable Coefficient T-Value
1 0.08653 2.296 1 0.20830 16.932
2 0.11268 2.631 2 -0.03484 -2.635
3 0.01264 0.233 3 0.01548 1.065
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The critical value of the t-statistic for 16 degrees of
freedom is 2.120 at the .05 level of significance.
Thus, at this point, the three-dimensional solution was
dropped since the third dimension did not appear to be
significant. The two-dimensional solution was then used to
obtain regression equations with the following results:
1969-1970 1971
Regression Regression
Variable Coefficient T-Value Variable Coefficient t1 -Value
1 -0.08440 -2.665 1 -0.11627 -9.286
2 0.10290 2.960 2 0.14322 10.746
Clearly both variables are significant for both regressions
since the critical t-value is now 2.110 for 17 degrees of
freedom at the .05 level.
Therefore, allowing Y to represent pro-defense proportion
of the vote, the regression equations for the two sets of
votes were











2The coefficient of determination (R ) for equation (1) was
.4828. For equation (2), R 2 was .9223. The R2 for 1971 is
extremely high and indicates a good fit of the regression
2
equation to the data. The R for 1969-1970 is obviously
not as good but considering the type of data being analyzed,
it is not totally unacceptable. Reasons for the difference
2in R will be discussed later.
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1 . Interpretation of Dimensions
The most difficult portion of the analysis then
ensued. The two dimensions had to be interpreted before any
conclusions could be drawn. Many different possible dimen-
sions were considered. Among these were:
1) Liberal/conservative sponsor of the bill
2) Pro-defense/anti-defense
3) Military Industrial Complex
4) Substantive versus ideological issues
5) Pro-techno logy/anti-technology
6) Non-partisan/partisan
7) Foreign policy/domestic policy
For the liberal/conservative sponsor of the bill dimension,
ratings of Senators by Americans for Democratic Action, a
liberal non-profit organization, were used to see if a
pattern developed when these ratings for each bill's sponsor
were placed beside the votes in a two-dimensional represen-
tation of the results [Refs. 11, 12, and 13]. However, this
procedure failed to indicate that this dimension was present.
Consideration of other dimensions by comparing the subject
and wording of each bill with its relative position produced
the same results except for non-partisan/partisan and foreign
policy/domestic policy which appeared to be the dimensions
represented in the solution.
The non-partisan/partisan hypothesis was tested by
using a measure called Index of Party Likeness (IPL) found in
Chapter Three of Ref. 2. IPL is defined as follows:
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%YES^ and %YES„ represent the percentage of Democrats and
D R
Republicans voting in favor of the bill. Thus, IPL is a
measure of how equally divided the two parties are. If 100%
of both parties vote "yes" on a given bill, IPL is 100 and
the vote is totally non-partisan. If 60% of both parties
vote "yes" on a bill, the IPL is still 100 and again the
vote is totally non-partisan. However, if 75% of the Demo-
crats vote "yes" and 25% of the Republicans vote "yes," IPL
is 100 - 50, or 50. If 100% of the Democrats vote "yes" and
100% of the Republicans vote "no," IPL is 100 - 100, or 0.
"Yes" percentages were based on voting participation records
in Congressional Quarterly Almanacs and not on recorded roll
call responses since Relative Agreement measures were based
on voting participation figures as well. Index of Party
Likeness scores were then calculated for the 20 votes in
1969-1970 and 1971 and are shown in Figures 1 and 2 beside
the votes for which they were calculated.
The IPL measure was used first for the 1971 data.
It was suspected that the X
?
axis (dimension two from the
KYST solution) might be non-partisan/partisan. After IPL
figures were calculated for all 20 votes, a rank-order
correlation computation was made based on the ranks of the
IPL values for votes and the corresponding ranks of the X_
coordinates for the same votes. Spearman's rho [Ref. 6,
p. 156] was used for the calculation and found to be +.573
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for the X« dimension. However, when vote D, a vote on mili-
tary pay raises, was dropped from the calculations, rho
jumped to +.760. Based on a t-test at the .05 level, the
hypothesis that rho was zero was rejected in both cases.
Thus, there appears to be a positive relationship between
Index of Party Likeness and the X
2
dimension. For a visual
comparison of IPL and the X» dimension, see Figure 2.
An examination of dimension X, for 1971 (dimension
one from the KYST solution) revealed that practically all
foreign policy votes appeared on the negative portion of
the axis and practically all domestic policy votes appeared
on the positive portion of the axis. Figure 2 illustrates
this. Selected votes appear to be good indicators of the
foreign policy/domestic policy dichotomy. Vote A, which had
the most negative value on the X, dimension, was an amendment
to reduce the number of United States military personnel in
Europe from 300,000 to 150,000. Vote T had the next most
negative value on that dimension and was an amendment to
reduce the number Of United States military personnel in
Europe to 250,000. Other votes with negative values dealt
with foreign military aid, the Vietnam War, and the Anti-
Ballistic Missle system (ABM) . The ABM system certainly had
foreign policy implications such as the effect on the Strate-
gic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), detente with the USSR, and
the arms race. Those votes which had stronger domestic
aspects were located closer to the origin such as the vote on
























































































































the Amchitka nuclear blast, and the F-14. The only vote
that appears out of place on the negative portion of the axis
is Vote I on the draft and military pay. However, any vote
concerning the draft in 1971 contained anti-war implications
and might be viewed, in that sense, as a foreign policy vote.
On the positive portion of the X, dimension, all votes
are domestic votes with the exception of vote H on the ter-
mination of United States military operations in Indochina
at the earliest practicable date. However, vote H is very
close to the origin and does not appear to be seriously mis-
placed. Other votes with positive values deal with the super-
sonic transport (SST) , military pay, and Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships, all of which are domestic
issues. A very interesting situation occurs when examining
the most positive vote on the X, axis. Vote M has the highest
positive value and concerns the Marine Corps' Harrier Aircraft
which was being produced in Great Britain. This particular
amendment would have eliminated funds to transfer production
of the Harrier airframe from Great Britain to the United
States. An examination of the 1971 Congressional Almanac
[Ref . 10, pp. 318-319] reveals that the amendment was aimed
at reducing the cost of the Harriers since a switch of
production to the United States would have increased the
total costs of production. The primary argument against the
amendment was the prospect of increased employment in the
St. Louis area since McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corporation
was to receive the contract. It should be observed that
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both Missouri Senators, Symington and Fagleton, opposed the
measure. Thus, there is a strong indication that this vote
was viewed in domestic terms.
As a result of this analysis, the two-dimensional
solution for 1971 appears to clearly represent a non-partisan/
partisan axis and a foreign policy/domestic policy axis.
However, when considering the 1969-1970 two-
dimensional solution, this result is not as clear. The
rank-order correlation between the Index of Party Likeness
and the corresponding X,, coordinate was only -.01. When
votes O and R, on fully testing weapons systems and foreign
aid respectively, were dropped, the correlation rose to +.17.
When two more of the original twenty votes (B and N which
were both ABM votes) were dropped, the correlation went up
to +.365. However, none of these passed a hypothesis test
at the .05 level as being significantly different from zero.
The argument that the X, dimension is foreign policy versus
domestic policy is also not as clear. There are several
votes out of place; however, the basic structure appears to
be there. On the negative portion of the axis are votes on
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, aid to Greece, foreign economic
and military assistance, ABM, and the use of defoliants in
Vietnam. Votes on lowering the overall Department of Defense
authorizations for 1971, a study of nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers, and Department of Defense public information funds
all were relatively close to the origin. But, one should
observe that both Department of Defense appropriations and
60

aircraft carriers possess foreign policy implications. In
addition, the bill on public information funds was only
slightly negative. Thus, the only bill that seems somewhat
out of place on the negative portion of the axis is the vote
requiring full testing of weapons systems prior to their
production. On the positive side of the axis, there are
votes on funds for the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) , cost accounting standards boards for
defense contracts, and sale of lead from the national stock-
pile. However, there were several votes with foreign policy
aspects in the positive direction, such as votes on Vietnam,
Cambodia, and foreign aid. All in all, the argument that
the dimensions for 1969-1970 and 1971 were the same seemed
to be fairly weak at this point.
However, noticing the similarity between the regres-
sion equations and between the general location of points
representing essentially the same type votes in both graphs,
it appeared that there was some justification for the suspi-
cion that the dimensions were the same. Two methods of
validation were used to compare the two solutions. The first
method was a Chow test for the difference between two regres-
sions [Ref. 39, p. 147]. Results from the two earlier
regressions and a single regression run with the combined
samples of 1969-1970 and 1971 data were used to calculate the
F-statistic for this test. The resulting F-value was .051.
At the .05 level for three degrees of freedom in the numera-
tor and 14 degrees of freedom in the denominator, the
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critical F-value is 2.52. Thus, the null hypothesis for this
test, that the two regressions are the same, could not be
rejected.
The second method of validation was the use of -the
regression equation for 1969-1970 to predict 1971 pro-defense
proportion of the vote using coordinates from the 1971 solu-
tion as the independent variables. The comparison of actual
and predicted values appears in Appendix C. Calculations of
the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient [Ref. 6,
p. 152] between the actual and predicted values yielded a
value of .9601. In effect, this result meant that the regres-
sion equation for 1969-1970 predicted the pro-defense vote
2for 1971 better than it did for 1969-1970, since the R for
1969-1970 was only .4828 and .9601 is .9218. An equally
interesting result was the finding that the predicted value
accurately predicted whether the defense position would win
or lose in 19 out of 20 votes, or 95% of the time.
2 . Possible Reasons for Confounding in
the 1969-1970 Data
The results of the Chow test and the correlations
are compelling evidence that the two sets of dimensions
are the same. There seem to be several possible reasons for
the confounding taking place in the 1969-1970 solution.
First, the President took a position on only five
out of the twenty votes in 1969-1970, but on ten votes out
of twenty in 1971. This higher profile by the President in
1971 may have resulted in more political arm-twisting which
could have produced a partisan reaction to Presidential methods
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Second, traditionally the Congress has attempted to
go along with a new President as much as possible during his
first Congress. However, the honeymoon is usually over after
the first two years of his Presidency. This may account, in
part, for the fact that the non-partisan/partisan dimension
does not stand out as clearly as it does in 1971.
Third, there is good reason to believe that the 1969-
1970 data represents a transition period during which the
structure of the 1971 votes was emerging. As discussed
previously, the strong opposition of Congress to defense
measures really began in earnest in 1969. It may well be
the case that Senatorial attitudes were developed during
the 91st Congress into the very clear dimensions of the 1971
solution. Another consideration as well is the setback
suffered by the Administration during the 1970 elections.
Of 35 seats in the Senate, there were 25 Democratic incum-
bents and 10 Republican incumbents. In the November elections,
Democrats won 22 seats and Republicans won 11, with one
seat being won by a Conservative candidate and one being won
by an independent. Although the Republicans made a net gain
of two seats in the Senate , they lost more elections
than they won in the Senate. Races for the House of Repre-
sentatives and for Governors of states were definitely losses.
-
Democrats made a net gain of 11 Governorships and 9 House
seats [Ref. 9, pp. 1071-1073]. Congressional Quarterly
commented [Ref. 9, p. 1073]
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Despite the unprecedented off-year campaign efforts of
President Nixon and Vice President Agnew, most observers
felt the Republicans suffered a net loss in the Con-
gressional and gubernatorial elections of Nov. 3, 1970.
Fourth, the perception of defense issues in terms of
foreign policy aspects versus domestic policy aspects was
crystallizing and may have been reflected in the 1970 off-
year election. The domestic situation, i.e., inflation, had
become so bad in 1971 that immense political pressures
forced the President to impose wage and price controls and
devalue the dollar in August of that year. These two actions
further emphasized the conflict between foreign and domestic
objectives
.
Therefore, it appears that the 1969-1970 Congress
represents a transition period from the rubber stamp era of
the pre-1969 Senate to the clear-cut adversary structure of
the 1971 Senate.
3 . Discussion of Regression Coefficients
Before accepting a regression solution, one should
examine the signs of the coefficients to determine if they
are logical. Recall equations (1) and (2):










The X, variable, which is foreign policy versus domestic
policy, has a negative sign. This indicates that foreign
policy, which is on the negative portion of the X, axis, has
a positive effect on the pro-defense proportion of the vote;
i.e., the more foreign policy implications a vote has the
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higher its pro-defense vote is likely to be. Alternatively,
the more domestic implications there are in a given vote,
the less likely it is to have a high pro-defense vote. The
first and most logical explanation for this is the natural
tendency of the Congress to rally round the President on
foreign policy issues. One would thus expect a positive
relationship between the pro-defense vote and foreign policy
since a pro-defense vote was defined largely as the President's
position on a given bill. Second, the line of reasoning
that says defense spending reduces unemployment and
strengthens the economy has become increasingly discredited.
Rather, the argument for reducing defense spending to real-
locate that money to domestic programs has become more and
more prevalent. Thus, any defense issue which relies
largely on its implications for the economy is less likely
to obtain a high pro-defense vote than in the past. Third,
it would appear to be easy for a Senator to vote anti-defense
on a largely domestic defense issue.
The sign of the coefficient for the X_ variable is
positive. This indicates that the more non-partisan a bill
is the more likely it is to have a high pro-defense propor-
tion of the vote. Conversely, the more partisan a bill, the
less likely it is to have a high pro-defense vote. One
would certainly expect this result since a negative relation-
ship would indicate bi-partisan opposition to the President
on defense issues, an unlikely state of affairs. In addition,
the result is relatively obvious since the current President
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is a member of the minority party. He has to have non-
partisan support to get any bill passed, or defeated, The
striking thing about this dimension is simply that it occurs
at all. Traditionally, all defense issues have been non-
partisan. However, here is a strong indication that this
may no longer be the case.
B. PROJECTED AREAS OF FMPHASIS IN FUTURE SUPPORT
OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS BEFORE THE SENATE
After reviewing the signs of regression coefficients in
the previous section, it appears that a partisan domestic
issue has the least likelihood of achieving a high pro-defense
vote. Hence, based on this analysis, proponents for the
Department of Defense should stress the foreign policy impli-
cations of a defense bill or program and de-emphasize domestic
implications. Every effort should be made to frame the argu-
ment in non-partisan terms. In addition, it might be better
if more conciliatory efforts were made towards achieving bi-
partisan support rather than portraying every vote, perhaps
non-defense as well as defense, in terms of "us versus them."
Indications are that a less combative approach, less critical
of Congress, might yield better results than previous
characterizations of Congress as wasteful and irresponsible.
In short, a spirit of cooperation with Congress by the




C. INDICATIONS OF FURTHER RESFARCH
This effort has been an initial attempt to combine for
the first time many different quantitative techniques into
one study to examine attitudes in the Senate. While these
results must be considered tentative, they are encouraging.
The approach of this paper points to fruitful areas for fur-
ther research.
1. Further Validation of 1969-1970 and 1971 Results
More work could be concentrated on the three years
examined in this thesis, which appear to be pivotal with
regard to future relations with the Senate. A possible
approach would be a further attempt to validate these results
by choosing votes to be scaled by both random as well as
various systematic selection schemes. Further work might
also be done with regard to enlarging the number of votes
under consideration, even though that proved to be extremely
difficult during this study. It would be very interesting
to determine if the same results are obtained when different
votes are used and larger numbers of votes are used. The
methodology for these tests might well be a Chow test for
the difference between two regressions based on votes from
the same year or the same Congress.
2
.
Examination of Later Years
Further research should be conducted on later years
to determine if the structure of voting in the Senate is
emerging as has been hypothesized. Data for 1972 is currently
available and comparisons between the 91st Congress and both
sessions of the 92d Congress might further illuminate the
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situation. Comparisons between 1971 and 1972 would also be
interesting to see if shifts occurred during the 92d Congress
Of course, research on the 93d Congress can begin as soon as
data is compiled after the end of this session. It would
also be of interest to determine if the 1972 elections pro-




The subject of roll-call analysis was introduced in
Section I. A brief review of the literature showed that a
study of roll call votes in the Senate on defense issues
could be used to gain insight into the manner in which such
issues are perceived by members of the Senate.
Section II discussed multidimensional scaling in some
detail. J. B. Kruskal's technique was explained and some of
the problems such as local minima and interpretation of
dimensions were examined.
The Brams and O'Leary "Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"
was covered in Section III with emphasis on the index called
Relative Agreement between votes. Relative Agreement was the
measure used in this thesis to obtain similarity observations
for input to KYST , a computer program using Kruskal's multi-
dimensional scaling technique.
Section IV contained a discussion of the procedure used
to conduct the analysis of Senate voting. The problems with
the use of the Relative Agreement index when applied to
actual roll-call data were discussed. The method of vote
selection for this analvsis was described in detail
and a pragmatic approach to the problem of interpretation of
multidimensional scaling solutions was presented. This
practical approach to interpretation involved the use of
regression analysis as an aid to interpreting the solution.
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In addition, the usefulness of regression analysis for this
situation was discussed, along with the techniques used to
validate the 1969-1970 model of pro-defense voting in the
Senate
.
Section V presented results of the analysis and conclu-
sions to be drawn from these results. The multidimensional
scaling solutions for twenty votes in both 1 Q 69-1970 and 1971
resulted in a two-dimensional interpretation of Senate percep-
tion of defense votes. The two dimensions were non-partisan/
partisan and foreign policy versus domestic policy aspects
of defense issues. The regression model for 1969-1970 data
was validated with votes from 1971 by means of a Chow test
for the difference between two regressions and by comparing
the actual values of pro-defense proportion of the vote for
1971 with the predicted values by using the Pearson product
moment correlation coefficient. Based on the results for
the time period under consideration, it would appear that
partisan domestic issues have the least likelihood of
obtaining a high pro-defense vote, while non-partisan
foreign policy issues are most likely to obtain a high pro-
defense proportion of the vote. Hence, for the Senate
sessions examined, it would seem that arguments for defense
programs emphasizing non-partisan foreign policy aspects of
such programs would be most likely to succeed, while arguments






This appendix presents an example of the computation of
stress for four points in two dimensions. The basic elements
of the example are drawn from pages 80 to 82 in Ref. 29.
The "true" configuration of points is given in Figure 3
and will be used to show how the stress would be computed
on the first iteration of the computer program. The axes are
labelled X and Y merely for identification and have no
physical or other significance.
From this "true" configuration, the actual distance
between the points will be used to obtain the dissimilarities








CD =\/l 2 + l 2 = /2~
BC =yo 2 + 4 2 = 4






AD =\l2 2 + 5 2 = /2~9
Forming a monotone increasing ordering of dissimilarities
yields
AB < CD < BC < AC < BD < AD
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Figure 4 indicates the initial configuration of the four
points. Again, the axes are labelled for identification
only.
To determine the distances between points from the







must be used. The number of dimensions, t, equals two and
Euclidean distance is chosen so r also equals two. The
computation for the distance from A to B is as follows:
d AT5 = [|l-0| 2 + |0-l| 2 ]^ = /2 =i 1.414AB ' ' ' '
Similarly, the remaining distances are
dAC " 1 -°
dAD= * 2.24
dBC " * 2.24
dBD " 1 -°
dCD= * 2.83
Comparing the computed distances to the dissimilarity order-
ing to check the monotonicity requirement yields
AB CD BC AC BD AD
1.41 2.83 2.24 1.00 1.00 2.24
Obviously, the ordering is not monotonically increasing as
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how close the configuration is to monotonicity . But before
stress can be calculated, the d. . 's, a set of numbers
satisfying the rank order constraints, must be computed. A
detailed description of this computation occurs in Ref. 23
but the basic idea is to obtain a monotone ordering of
numbers derived from the distances calculated from the trial
configuration
.
Beginning with the d. ,'s just computed and ordered as
required by the constraint, one obtains
1.41 2.83 2.24 1.0 1.0 2.24
The first two numbers, 1.41 and 2.83, are monotone increasing
but the next two, 2.8 3 and 2.24, are not. To produce a
monotone ordering up to that point, 2.83 and 2.24 are
averaged to yield 2.535. The first three numbers are now
monotone. Presently, the ordering is
1.41 2.535 2.535 1.0 1.0 2.24
The averaging procedure is followed until the ordering is
monotone. The following two lines indicate successive
steps to reach a solution for the d. .'s. The last line is
ID
the solution since it is monotone increasing.
1.41 2.023 2.023 2.023 1.00 2.24
1.41 1.768 1.768 1.768 1.768 2.24
Before computing stress, it will be instructive to look at
a plot of dissimilarities versus distances. The vertical
axis on the graph represents dissimilarities and hence is an
ordinal scale. The horizontal axis represents distance
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(d. . and d. .) and is an interval scale. A small x represents
the distance, d.., obtained from the trial configuration;
' lj' 3
while a small o represents the d. . calculated for the two
points i and j except where d. . = d. .. For this case, a
small x is used to indicate both values. The distances along
the dashed lines indicate the departure from monotonicity
for each d. . and represent the terms (d. . - d. .) which are
ID ID ID
squared in the numerator of the stress formula.
For this example, stress is calculated as follows:








(2.83-1.768) 2+(2.24-1.76 8) 2+(1.0-1.76 8) 2 + (1 . 0-1 . 768)





Since the stress is .34, the configuration is a rather
poor fit. A comparison of the "true" configuration and the
initial (trial) configuration readily verifies this. It
should be noted that a "true" configuration will not be known
in problems of practical interest in which multi-dimensional
scaling is used. The "true" configuration was used here only
for illustrative purposes.
After the stress is calculated and found to be poor,



















of stress and a step-size would be computed and movement
along the gradient would be accomplished to reach a new
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